Substantial most of the evidence
Partial meaningful, not sufficient
Supporting we contribute
Not covered outside our scope
Article 20(2)
Management bodies are required to follow training
Substantial
What we do
Board and executive members are enrolled like any other population, with training assigned
automatically and completion tracked. Simulations can target this group specifically, which
matters because senior staff are the ones actually attacked.
Your evidence
Dated completion certificates per person. Training history by individual. Simulation results
for the management group as a distinct population.
Still yours
Deciding who constitutes your management body, and ensuring they actually complete it. The
obligation is personal and cannot be delegated.
Article 21(2)(g)
Basic cyber hygiene practices and cybersecurity training
Substantial
What we do
An ongoing programme rather than an annual event: simulations across email, SMS and voice,
with training assigned automatically to whoever slips. Role-based content for populations at
elevated risk.
Your evidence
Annual programme by population with completion tracked. Per-person certificates. Phishing
resilience trend over time.
Still yours
Setting the programme cadence, and following up with anyone who does not complete.
Article 21(2)(f)
Assessing the effectiveness of risk-management measures
Substantial
What we do
This is what continuous simulation is for. Click and report rates measured over time are
direct evidence of whether awareness measures are working — rather than
evidence that training was delivered.
Your evidence
Simulation results by campaign and population. Improvement trend. Domain health score history
showing configuration measures holding or slipping.
Still yours
Assessing measures outside awareness and email security.
Article 21(2)(d)
Supply chain security
Partial
What we do
Lookalike domain detection addresses a supply-chain vector most tooling misses entirely: an
attacker impersonating you to invoice your customers, or impersonating a supplier to invoice
you. DMARC enforcement prevents your domain being the vehicle.
Your evidence
Lookalike findings with dates raised and resolved. DMARC enforcement status and the sending
sources authorised to use your domain.
Still yours
Supplier assessment, contractual security requirements, and third-party risk management
generally. We cover the impersonation vector.
Article 21(2)(a)
Policies on risk analysis and information system security
Partial
What we do
Human risk is quantified per person, team and department, and reassessed continuously rather
than annually. Domain configuration risk is scored and tracked over time.
Your evidence
Risk scoring by department. Domain health scores with history. Trend reporting showing
whether measures are working.
Still yours
The wider risk analysis — assets, systems, threats and treatment decisions. We cover the
human and email-domain slice.
Article 21(2)(h)
Policies and procedures regarding the use of cryptography
Partial
What we do
Certificate monitoring records key strength, signature algorithm, issuer and expiry across
your domains, with warnings scaled to each certificate’s own lifetime as industry
maximums fall toward 47 days.
Your evidence
Certificate inventory with key sizes and algorithms. Expiry tracking. DKIM key strength,
including detection of keys too short to be trusted.
Still yours
Your cryptographic policy itself, key management for systems we do not see, and post-quantum
planning.
Article 21(2)(b)
Incident handling
Supporting
What we do
DNS Watcher provides the timeline evidence incident handling depends on: when a record
changed, what it was before, and who acknowledged it.
Your evidence
Dated change history per domain. Snapshot history for the period under investigation.
Still yours
Your incident handling process, detection across everything else, and reporting to your CSIRT
under Article 23.
Article 21(2)(e)
Security in acquisition, development and maintenance
Supporting
What we do
Continuous configuration monitoring is the maintenance half of this for your email domains
— a correct configuration that silently degrades is the failure mode this measure exists
to prevent.
Your evidence
Configuration check history. DNS change record with before and after values.
Still yours
Secure development practices, vulnerability handling and disclosure, and acquisition security
generally.
What we don’t cover
Listed because a mapping that omits its gaps implies coverage. If a vendor’s NIS2 page has
no section like this one, that is worth asking about.
Article 21(2)(c)
Business continuity, backup management and crisis management
Not covered
Still yours
Entirely. We contribute nothing to this measure.
Article 21(2)(i)
HR security, access control and asset management
Not covered
Still yours
Beyond training records for the people on your account, this sits entirely outside what we
do.
Article 21(2)(j)
Multi-factor authentication and secured communications
Not covered
Still yours
Our own platform enforces MFA for administrators, which is not the same thing as helping you
meet this measure across your estate.
Article 23
Incident reporting obligations
Not covered
Still yours
We do not report to CSIRTs on your behalf, and no product should — the 24-hour early
warning and 72-hour assessment carry judgement that has to be yours.